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**VIA HAND-DELIVERY**

Magalie Salas, Esq.  
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Washington, D.C. 20554

Re: *Ex Parte* Letter -- WT Docket 97-82  
Proposal of Roseville PCS, Inc. on  
F Block Auction Eligibility

Dear Ms. Salas:

On behalf of Roseville PCS, Inc. ("RPCS"), this letter addresses the issue of eligibility for participation in the upcoming Auction 35 for F Block and C Block PCS spectrum. As set forth below, RPCS proposes that the Commission provide an opportunity for companies such as RPCS, who were eligible to participate in the original C and F Block auctions (Auctions 5 and 11), to be eligible to bid on F Block spectrum in Auction 35, notwithstanding the revenue limitations in Section 24.709 of the Commission's rules.

RPCS realizes that numerous parties have made proposals on eligibility in petitions for reconsideration/clarification in WT Docket 97-82, and/or have commented on such proposals. Yet, RPCS believes that the Commission could benefit from a viewpoint largely not heard in the current debate. RPCS is an entity small enough to have participated in the original C Block and F Block auctions, yet which has subsequently and recently grown above the current \$125 million annual revenue limit for C Block/F Block bidding eligibility, as set forth in Section 24.709 of the Commission's rules.

The opportunity for companies such as RPCS to bid on F block spectrum could be accomplished in any of the three following manners:

-revise the revenue limit in Section 24.709 of the Commission's rules to account for inflation subsequent to the adoption of the \$125 million figure in June of 1994. As shown below, the figure of \$145 million would be a rational and fair revision, based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index-Urban ("CPI-U") for the years 1994-2000; or

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-expand the spectrum on which "grandfathered" participants from Auctions 5 and 11 may bid to include both C and F Block licenses. Application of the grandfathering to F Block licenses could be limited to entities that previously bid on F Block spectrum in Auction 11; or

-if the Commission decides not to revise the revenue limits for bidders, or not to expand grandfathering to F Block spectrum, then it should open up the F Block to all bidders. As set forth below, RPCS believes that the use of bidding credits for "entrepreneurs" in this block is unnecessary for such entities to have a fair chance at obtaining F Block spectrum, and that use of bidding credits is contrary to the objectives set forth in Section 309(j) of the Communications Act.

Allowing companies such as RPCS to bid on F Block spectrum in Auction 35 would be consistent with the goals of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act, and would remedy the unfairness to original bidders who would have obtained certain F Block licenses, but for the fact that the "winner" of those licenses bid irresponsibly, and then declared bankruptcy.

#### About Roseville PCS

RPCS holds an approximate 97 percent interest in West Coast PCS, LLC ("West Coast"). West Coast obtained E-Block PCS licenses in Auction No. 11 for the Sacramento, Stockton, Modesto and Yuba City BTAs. All of these licenses have been paid in full. PCS service is currently being provided in three of those BTAs, with construction and commencement of service in the remaining BTA expected in the near future.

West Coast/RPCS qualified as a designated entity, and bid for C Block spectrum in Auction No. 5 and F Block spectrum in Auction No. 11. When prices for the licenses on which it was bidding became uneconomic, West Coast dropped out of the bidding on those licenses. The winning bidders on those licenses subsequently declared bankruptcy, and the spectrum thus remains unused.

While RPCS and its parent company RCC are not among the financial giants of the wireless telecommunications industry, they have been successful companies. Because of that success, RCC's revenues have recently grown over the \$125 million limit set forth in Section 24.709 of the Commission's rules, and RPCS will not be allowed to bid on F Block spectrum in Auction 35. In order to promote the goals of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act, and fairness to responsible bidders in the original C and F Block auctions, RPCS urges the Commission to modify its rules in one or more of the ways set forth herein, so that RPCS and similarly situated companies<sup>1</sup> may compete for F Block spectrum.

#### Proposed Solutions

RPCS suggests three ways to revise the rules, in a manner consistent with the goals of Section 309(j), so that companies such as RPCS may bid for F Block spectrum.

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<sup>1</sup> An example of a similarly situated company that has participated in the recent round of advocacy in this proceeding appears to be Dobson Communications Corporation. See, *Notice of Ex Parte Communication*, filed April 20, 2000.

1. Revise the revenue limit in Section 24.709 of the Commission's rules to account for inflation subsequent to the adoption of the \$125 million figure. The \$125 million dollar figure was adopted as the definition of "entrepreneur" for the purposes of broadband PCS auctions in the *Fifth Report and Order in PP Docket 93-253 (Competitive Bidding)*, 9 FCC Rcd 5532, released June 29, 1994. By the time Auction 35 occurs, at least six years will have passed. As the Commission well knows, inflation has occurred during that time, undercutting the propriety of that figure. A review of the growth of the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Urban Consumer Price Index ("CPI-U") shows that \$125 million in July of 1994 is equivalent to approximately \$145 million in April of 2000 (the latest month for which figures are available). This is calculated<sup>2</sup> as follows:

- a. July 1994 CPI-U: 148.0
- b. April 2000 CPI-U: 171.2
- c. Inflation factor: 1.1567  
(Line b/line a)
- d. Current Revenue Limit: \$125 Million
- e. Adjusted Revenue Limit: \$144.594 Million  
(line c \* line d)

Rounded to \$145 million, this figure provides a rational adjustment of the maximum annual revenue figure for companies eligible to bid on C and F Block licenses, if the Commission is going to continue to limit eligibility based on financial resources.<sup>3</sup> Such an adjustment is also consistent with the recognition in the Commission's rules that "entrepreneurs" will grow, and that their revenues will also grow. See Section 24.709(a)(3) (increases in gross revenues

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<sup>2</sup> CPI-U information is available at the BLS Website at <http://stats.bls.gov/cpihome.htm>. At that site, click on the line marked "Table Containing History of CPI-U U.S."

<sup>3</sup> RPCS recognizes that the Commission has used a different factor for inflation adjustment for the purposes of classifying carriers for various accounting and reporting purposes. See, e.g., *Public Notice* DA 00-971, released May 3, 2000. However, that factor, the gross domestic product chain-type index (GDPPI), is not as appropriate in this proceeding as an index based on consumer prices. Changes in wholesale cost and industrial expense indices (e.g., the GDPPI) are not as accurate as indices based on consumer prices in reflecting variations in the revenues of potential bidders, since the revenue of bidders is derived primarily from retail sales, which are reflected in consumer price indexes. Furthermore, use of the GDPPI would create an inflation factor of only 9.94 percent, raising the revenue threshold to only \$137 million, a level which would not make RPCS and similarly situated companies eligible for the auction.

due to business development or expanded services does not negate an entity's on-going qualification as an entrepreneur). This sort of internal growth is precisely the reason why RPCS/RCC and similarly situated companies have subsequently gone over the \$125 million revenue level.

2. Expand the spectrum on which "grandfathered" participants in Auctions 5 and 11 may bid, to include both C Block and F Block licenses. Application of the grandfathering to F Block licenses could be limited to entities that previously bid on F Block spectrum in Auction 11.

Section 24.709(a)(9)(i) of the Commission's rules provides that entities that participated in the original C/F Block auctions (Nos. 5 and 11) may participate, regardless of their current revenue/asset figures, in auctions for C Block spectrum commencing in a two year period from, in effect, the most recent C Block auction (No. 22, which started on March 23, 1999). The rule does not explicitly address similar grandfathering for original participants in Auctions 5 and 11 who now wish to bid on F Block spectrum.<sup>4</sup> The closest that the Commission has come to explaining the grandfathering for the purposes of the C Block but not for the purposes of the F Block is in the *Order on Reconsideration of the Fourth Report and Order* in this proceeding, 15 FCC Rcd 4740 (2000). In paragraph 8 of that *Order*, the Commission notes that grandfathering was part of a limited relief package offered only to C Block auction participants, due to the unique financial difficulties that plagued C Block winners. RPCS believes, however, that this is not an accurate view of the relationship between the grandfathering provision and other relief given to C Block participants: in the *Second Report and Order* in this proceeding, the distinction between the difficulties of C Block and F Block participants is only made in the context of the disaggregation, amnesty and prepayment remedies made available to C Block participants, not in the context of grandfathering of eligibility. 12 FCC Rcd 16436 (1997) at para. 20.

In any case, policy reasons support extending the grandfathering provisions to bidders on F Block spectrum. First, this would be one way of remedying the unfairness to original bidders who would have obtained certain F Block licenses, but for the fact that the "winner" of those licenses bid irresponsibly, and then declared bankruptcy. Similarly, expansion of the grandfathering to bidding on F Block licenses would remedy the fact that certain entrepreneurs have subsequently grown over the revenue limit in part due to the extensive delays in reauction of F Block licenses caused by bankruptcy litigation initiated by the previous "winners" of the licenses.

3. Open Up the F Block for All Bidders. If the Commission decides not to revise the revenue limits for bidders, or not to expand grandfathering to F Block spectrum, then it should open up the F Block auction to all bidders. RPCS concurs with the numerous petitioners and other recent participants in this proceeding who have demonstrated that opening up the F Block to all bidders would further the Section 309(j)(3) goals of rapid deployment of advanced technologies, recovery to the public of value for the spectrum, and efficient use of the spectrum. Indeed, even if companies like RPCS no longer qualify as

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<sup>4</sup> A *Public Notice* on Auction No. 22 procedures, DA 99-302, released February 8, 1999, does state that entities may use grandfathering to qualify to bid on C Block licenses, but not on F Block licenses. No explanation for this distinction is given.

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"entrepreneurs", allowing them to bid on F and C Block spectrum furthers the Section 309(j)(3)(B) goal of promoting economic opportunity and competition.

RPCS asserts that if the F Block is opened up for all bidders, "bidding credits" should not be made available to any bidders. There does not appear to be a need to create a non-level playing field in the F Block. Smaller companies can compete, and as evidenced by the recent access to the capital markets, can afford to pay for these licenses. Indeed, RPCS is an example, in Auction No. 11, of a company that qualified for bidding credits in the F Block as a "designated entity", but succeeded in obtaining spectrum in the E block, without bidding credits.

In sum, allowing companies such as RPCS to bid on F Block spectrum would further the goals of Section 309(j)(3) of the Communications Act, and help remedy companies who were unfairly denied such spectrum as a result of other bidders' irresponsible actions. This goal could be achieved by revising the \$125 million revenue limit up to \$145 million to account for inflation, or by expanding the "grandfathering" of participants in Auctions 5 and 11 who have grown over the \$125 revenue limit, from eligibility merely to bid on C Block licenses, to eligibility to bid on C Block and F Block licenses. Application of the grandfathering to F Block licenses could be limited to entities that previously bid on F Block spectrum in Auction 11. However, if the Commission chooses not to enact one of these two solutions, then it should open up the F Block to all bidders.

Thank you for your consideration of these proposals. Please don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions, or if we can be of further assistance.

Very truly yours,

ROSEVILLE PCS, INC.



Paul J. Feldman

Its Attorney

cc: Chairman William Kennard  
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